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Abstract
Multi-agent learning is a challenging problem in machine learning that has appli-
cations in different domains such as distributed control, robotics, and economics.
We develop a prescriptive model of multi-agent behavior using Markov games.
Since in many multi-agent systems, agents do not necessary select their optimum
strategies against other agents (e.g., multi-pedestrian interaction), we focus on
models in which the agents play “exploration but near optimum strategies”. We
model such policies using the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution. This leads to a set of
coupled Bellman equations that describes the behavior of the agents. We introduce
a st of conditions under which the set of equations admit a unique solution and
propose two algorithms that provably provide the solution in finite and infinite
time horizon scenarios. We also study a practical setting in which the interactions
can be described using the occupancy measures and propose a simplified Markov
game with less complexity. Furthermore, we establish the connection between the
Markov games with exploration strategies and the principle of maximum causal
entropy for multi-agent systems. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our
algorithms via several well-known games from the literature and some games that
are designed based on real world applications.
1 Introduction
A multi-agent system can be defined as a group of autonomous agents that are interacting in a
common environment. Due to their rich ability of modeling complex dynamics, multi-agent systems
are rapidly finding applications in different fields such as autonomous robotics, telecommunications,
distributed control, and economics. Although the behavior of agents in a multi-agent system can be
predefined in advance, it is often necessary that they explore new behaviors to gradually improve
their performance. Another reason that makes the a priori design of a good strategy even more
difficult is that many multi-agent systems contain humans as agents. In such systems, modeling
agents’ preferences for selecting their strategies is often complex.
Stochastic games (SGs) have been used for modeling multi-agent systems. However, most of
the existing works consider fully cooperative scenarios Wei and Luke [2016] or settings in which
particular communication between the agents is possible. Considering systems such as autonomous
cars and their interactions with pedestrians, it is clear that some multi-agent systems are partially
cooperative or even competitive, and in many situations, no communication links can be established
between the agents. More importantly, in these systems, agents select their strategies knowing that
the other agents also select their strategies with the same level of awareness.
Another important property of such systems is that the agents do not always select their best-response
strategies. This is related to Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) which is a smoothed-out best
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Figure 1: A multi-agent system in which the goals of players A and B are to reach a and b, respectively.
responses, in the sense that agents are more likely to select better strategies than worse strategies
McKelvey and Palfrey [1995]. This idea has also its origins in statistical limited dependent variable
models such as in economics McKelvey and Palfrey [1998], Goeree et al. [2002], psychology, and in
biology Palfrey [2016]. As an example, consider the grid game between two players {A, B} in Figure
1. Each player can choose to stay at its current position or move to one of its adjacent neighbors.
Players A and B want to reach their destinations at a and b, respectively and avoid collision. For
simplicity, assume the players are aware of each other’s goals, i.e., A knows that B wants to go to
b and vice versa but they cannot communicate and they only get to play this game once. In real
world, the pedestrians (players) may face similar situation and they can reach their goals with small
chance of collision by selecting a set of near optimal strategies that consider the behavior of the other
pedestrians.
This work aims to mimic the logical abilities of human, by building a method that reasons about the
anticipated learning of the other agents and select an exploration but near optimum mixed strategy.
Overall, the proposed model in this work can be categorized as a prescriptive, non-cooperative
agenda according to Shoham et al. [2007]. In our modeling, we take advantage of game theory and
reinforcement learning. Previous works have also attempted to model similar systems but using
different models such as social forces Helbing and Molnar [1995], potential fields Alahi et al. [2014],
flow fields Ali and Shah [2008], fictitious games Ma et al. [2017], and others Kretzschmar et al.
[2014], Huang et al. [2015], Park et al. [2016], Jain et al. [2015], Carmel and Markovitch [1999]. Yet
these works are performing either in static environments or in dynamic environments with short-term
prediction, and they do not address the complex interactions among the agents.
Contributions: We propose a game-theoretic model in which all agents select mixed strategies
that are distributed according to the Boltzmann distribution. In this case, the strategies of the agents
depend on their Q-functions and simultaneously, the Q-functions depend on the strategies.
• We introduce a set of coupled Bellman-type equations describing the Q-functions of the
agents and show that under some conditions, this set of equations have a unique solution. In
another words, we introduce a set of assumptions under which there exists a unique QRE
for our Markove game.
• Assuming that the agents are aware of each other’s goals1, we propose two algorithms to
obtain the solutions in finite and infinite time horizon settings.
• We study a practical setting in which the occupancy measures of the agent can capture their
interactions and propose a forward-backward algorithm to obtain their behavior with less
complexity compared to the general setting.
• We establish the connection between our model and the principle of maximum causal entropy.
This result can be used to develop an algorithm in which each agent can simultaneously
infer the goals of the others and its strategy.
1Goals can be interpreted differently depending on the problem. In this context, we mean the reward (utility)
functions.
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2 Related Works
In this section, we review some related multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms. For
a more comprehensive review please see Busoniu et al. [2008], Albrecht and Stone [2018].
Depending on the overall goal of the agents, MARLs can be divided into cooperative or non-
cooperative. Cooperative SGs are the games in which agents have the same reward function and the
learning goal is to maximize the common discounted return. The learning algorithms in such SGs are
typically derived from a model-free algorithm known as Q-learning Lauer and Riedmiller [2000],
Greenwald et al. [2003], Bowling [2003], Hu and Wellman [2003]. Combination of cooperative
and competitive Q-learning was developed in Littman [2001a] called friend-or-foe (FOF). The
convergence of these algorithms is based on several strong assumptions, which may not be realistic
in real problems. For instance, either every stage game during learning has a Nash equilibrium or
every stage game has a Nash equilibrium that is both beneficiary for the other agents and the learner
does not benefit from deviating from this equilibrium Bowling [2000]. Such requirement is satisfied
in a small class of problems. However, our model is not necessarily cooperative and we show that if
the norm of the reward functions are bounded, our model has a unique equilibrium.
The work in Guestrin et al. [2002] develops an approach that simplifies the coordination among the
agents when the Q-function can be decomposed additively into local functions such that each local
function only depends on the actions of a subset of agents. Works in Kok et al. [2005], Kok and
Vlassis [2005] study conditions under which such decomposition of an optimal joint action can be
guaranteed. Team Q-learning algorithm is another type of learning algorithm for cooperative SGs
and it is based on an assumption that the agents have unique optimal joint actions. Therefore, they
are able to learn the common Q-function in parallel Littman [2001b]. However, this is rarely the case
in real world problems.
Agent-tracking algorithms estimate models of the other agents’ strategies and response to them
accordingly. For example, the joint action learners in Claus and Boutilier [1998] use empirical models
of the other agents’ strategies. i.e., agent i’s model of j’s strategy is defined as
piij(aj) := C
i
j(aj)/
∑
a
Cij(a),
where piij(aj) is agent i’s empirical model of agent j’s strategy and C
i
j(aj) denotes the number of
times agent i observed agent j taking action aj . On the other hand, the FMG algorithm in Kapetanakis
and Kudenko [2002] keeps track of only those actions that yielded good rewards in the past. Similar
to our work, agents in FMQ use Boltzmann action selection. However, it only works for deterministic
dynamics. Moreover, FMQ increases the Q-values of only those actions that produced good rewards
in the past. This enforces the agent towards coordination.
Algorithms based on fictitious game Ma et al. [2017], Conitzer and Sandholm [2007], MetaStrategy
algorithm Powers and Shoham [2005], and Hyper-Q learning Tesauro [2004] are other related
examples. The AWESOME algorithm in Conitzer and Sandholm [2007] uses fictitious play that
switches from the best response in fictitious play to a pre-computed Nash equilibrium. The work
in Hernandez-Leal and Kaisers [2017] directly models the distribution over opponents. However,
addressing the dynamic behavior of the opponent is missing in this work. The heuristic algorithm in
Ma et al. [2017] also uses the fictitious game approach. Analogous to our work, it models the policies
of the agents by Boltzmann distribution. However, unlike our algorithm, during the forecast of the
agents’ policies, the learning algorithm in Ma et al. [2017] is agnostic to the fact that each agent
selects its policy also by forecasting its opponents’ policies and it misses theoretical analysis.
Authors in Wang and Sandholm [2003] propose an optimal adaptive learning for team Markov games
in which each agent solves a virtual game that is constructed on top of each stage game. Hence, each
agent requires empirically estimating a model of the SG, model of the other agents, and estimating an
optimal value function for the SG. Under some conditions, it convergences to a coordinated optimal
joint action Wunder et al. [2010]. We use a similar approach in the sense that each agent solves a
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virtual game to find its policy but in non-stationary and non-cooperative setting and without empirical
estimation of the SG.
Works that use policy search method in multi-agent setting are the alternative to the Q-learning
based algorithms. Generalized IGA Zinkevich [2003] and GIGA-WoLF Bowling [2005] are two
such algorithms. However, unlike the setting in this work, both are designed for two-agent and
two-action games. Deep neural network has been also used in MARL problems Vinyals et al. [2019].
Most deep-MARL algorithms are also developed for fully cooperative settings Omidshafiei et al.
[2017], Foerster et al. [2017a] and emergent communication Foerster et al. [2016], Sukhbaatar et al.
[2016]. The work in Leibo et al. [2017] considers general sum settings with independent learner
and Lowe et al. [2017] proposes a centralized actor-critic architecture for efficient training in mixed
environments. However, they do not reason about the other agents’ behaviors. Heinrich and Silver
[2016], Lanctot et al. [2017] use the principle of best response algorithms. However, such best
responses may not be desired or executed by the agents.
Analogous to the LOLA algorithm Foerster et al. [2017b] and the algorithm based on generative
adversarial networks Metz et al. [2016], our algorithm makes no assumptions about cooperation
among the agents and simply assumes that each agent is maximizing its own return. However, LOLA
is developed by approximating the value function of a two-player game in which the policy of each
player is parameterized with a recurrent neural network. The algorithm in Metz et al. [2016] relies on
an end-to-end differentiable loss function, and thus does not work in the general RL setting.
3 Preliminaries
Markov Decision Process: A Markov decision process (MDP) is specified by a tuple
(X ,A, P0, P,R). The set of states is X that can be continuous or discrete but in this work we
consider a discrete state space and a finite set of actions A. The initial distribution P0 describes
the initial state x(0). The transition probabilities are denoted by P (x(t + 1)|x(t), a(t)) that is the
probability of transitioning to state x(t+ 1) after selecting action a(t) at state x(t). The agent gets
R(x, a) ∈ R as a reward for selecting action a at state x. A policy pi(a|x) is a conditional distribution
that specifies how an agent selects its actions at state x. Stationary policies do not depend on the time
step.
The agent’s goal in an infinite-time horizon setting is to maximize, at each time-step k, the expected
discounted return
E
[∑
τ≥0
γτR(x(τ + k), a(τ + k))
]
,
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor and the expectation is taken over the probabilistic state
transitions. The Q-function, Qpi : X ×A → R for a given policy pi is defined as
Qpi(x, a) :=E[
∑
τ≥0
γτR(x(τ), a(τ))|x0 = x, a0 = a, pi].
The optimal Q-function is defined as Q∗(x, a) = maxpi Qpi(x, a) and it is characterized by the
Bellman optimality equation:
Q∗(x, a) = R(x, a) + γ
∑
x′
P (x′|x, a)V ∗(x′), (1)
V ∗(x′) = max
a
Q∗(x′, a).
A broad spectrum of single-agent RL algorithms exists, e.g., model-based methods based on dynamic
programming Bertsekas [1995] and model-free methods based on online estimation of value functions.
Markov Game: A natural extension of an MDP to multi-agent environments is using Markov
games Thuijsman [1992]. Markov games are a special case of stochastic games (SGs), that are defined
by a tuple (X1, ...,XM ,A1, ...,AM , P0, P,R1, ..., RM ), where M is the number of agents, Xi, Ai,
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and Ri are the state space2, action space and the reward function of agent (player) i, respectively. In
this work, we assume that all agents share the same action space A. We denote the state of agent i
at time τ by xi(τ), and the state of its opponents by ~x−i(τ). We also denote the policy of agent i
at time τ by piτi (a|~x) : X1 × ...× XM ×A → R. Stationary policies are denoted analogously but
without time superscript. When Ri = R, for all i ∈ [M ] := {1, ...,M}, the agents have the same
goal and the SG is cooperative.
4 Markov Game with Exploration Strategies
4.1 Infinite-time Horizon
As we mentioned, most of the existing works consider scenarios in which the agents play their best
strategies against their opponents’ best or random strategies. However, in different settings such as
human movements in a crowd, the behaviors (strategies) are not necessary optimal but rather close to
optimal. In this work, we assume that all agents select their mixed strategies such that actions with
higher Q-functions3 are selected with higher probabilities (Boltzmann distribution), i.e.,
pii(ai|~x) ∝ exp (βQi(~x, ai)), for i ∈ [M ], (2)
where 0 < β is known as the inverse temperature. This particular form of policy allows us to
model the behavior of exploring agents (e.g., human) in a common environment. The interactions
between the agents are encoded into their Q-functions. We define the Q-function of agent i ∈ [M ] in
infinite-time horizon setting as follows,
Qi(~x, ai) = Ri(~x, ai) + γEpi−i [Vi(~x′)|~x, ai], (3)
In the above equations, ~x denotes (xi, ~x−i), and the expectation is taken over the probabilistic state
transitions and the strategies of the i’s opponents (−i := [M ] \ {i}). The first term in (3) is the
individual reward of agent i that represents the immediate effect of action ai at state ~x. The second
term encodes the future effect of selected action ai considering the behavior of i’s opponents. In this
equation, Vi denotes the value-function,
Vi(~x
′) :=Epii [Qi(~x′; a′)]=
∑
a′
pii(a
′|~x′)Qi(~x′; a′). (4)
Since in (2), the agents select their actions based on the state of the game, the joint policy of the
agents can be factorized as follows
pi[M ](~a|~x) =
∏
j∈[M ]
pij(aj |~x). (5)
It worth noting that Lauer and Riedmiller [2000] defines the Q-function by assuming that the
opponents of agent i select their best actions, (taking maximum over the actions instead of the
expectation in (3)). But in this work, analogous to Ma et al. [2017], we assume that all the agents
select their actions according to the Boltzmann distribution.
Remark 1. An alternative definition of the value-function is to use softmax4 instead of the expecta-
tion in (4) Ziebart [2010], Zhou et al. [2018]. The idea of using softmax is to approximate the max
function in the definition of the Bellman equation (1). However, when the Q-function does not vary
too much for different actions, softmax(Q) will have a bias term of order log |A|, where |A| denotes
the number of actions5. On the other hand, the value-function in (4) which is also an approximation
of maxa′ Q(x′, a′) does not have this issue.
2It is common to represent the state of the game with a variable x, but without loss of generality, herein, we
describe the state of the game using ~x.
3It represents the quality of an action in a given state.
4It is given by softmaxx f(x) := log
∑
x exp(f(x)).
5Consider the following vector of length n, ~v = [z, ..., z], then softmax(~v) = z + logn but max(~v) = z.
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Equations (2)-(5) imply a set of M coupled equations describing the relationships between the
Q-functions/policies of the agents. More precisely, Equation (3), can be written as
Qi = Ri + γEExp{Q−i}[EExp{Qi}[Qi]]
:= Ti(Q−i, Qi), for i ∈ [M ]. (6)
In the above equations, we removed all the arguments only for simpler representation, and Exp{Qi}
denotes the policy of ith player that is given in (2). This model describes the behavior (policy
selection) of a set of interacting agents that do not always select their best responses but rather their
near optimal responses.
This raises two main questions that we will address in this section: does the system of equations in
(6) admits a unique solution? If so, how can agent i obtain its policy?
Next result shows that if the reward functions are bounded, Tis are contraction mappings. Therefore,
the equations in (6) admit a unique solution. The sketch of proof is provided in the Section 9.
Theorem 1. Assume that maxi ||Ri||∞ ≤ (1−γ)
2
2γMβ . Then, for every i ∈ [M ], Ti is a contraction
mapping.
The assumption of Theorem 6 is not restrictive as one can ensure it is satisfied by simply scaling the
reward functions. However, this may not be the case in some scenarios. Later, in the Section 7, we
introduce an alternative that relaxes this assumption to incorporate rewards with higher norms. Since
{Ti} are contraction mappings, one can find the solution of (6) using a value iteration algorithm.
Here, we present MGE-I in Algorithm 1 that can -approximate the solution of (6).
Algorithm 1 MGE-I
{Rj}, 
Initialize: ~Q0, ~Q1, s = 0
while maxj ||Qs+1j −Qsj || ≥  do
for j ∈ −i do
Qs+1j ← Tj(Qs−j , Qsj)
end for
Qs+1i ← Ti(Qs+1−i , Qsi )
s← s+ 1
end while
4.2 Finite-time horizon
In the finite-horizon setting, the problem is slightly different. This is because of non-stationary
policies and no discount factor γ in the definition of returns. More precisely, in our model, the
Q-function of the ith agent at time τ ∈ [0, T ] is defined by
Qτi (~x, ai) := Ri(~x, ai) + Epiτ−i [V
τ+1
i (~x
′)|~x, ai], (7)
V τ+1i (~x
′) = Epiτ+1i [Q
τ+1
i (~x
′, a′)],
with the boundary condition V Ti (~x) = Ri,F (~x) that is the final reward of agent i. Analogous to the
infinite-time horizon setup, the expectation in (7) depends on the policy of the other agents, which
we assume that are all distributed according to the Boltzmann distribution. Thus, Equation (7) can be
written as
Qτi = Ui(Q
τ
−i, V
τ+1
i ), for i ∈ [M ], (8)
where Ui denotes the right hand side of Equation (7). Similar to the result of infinite-time horizon
section, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. If maxi{||Ri||∞, ||Ri,F ||∞} ≤ 1/2β(M−1)(1+T ), then Ui is a contraction mapping
with respect to its first argument.
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This result shows that the system of equations in (8) admits a unique set of solution { ~Q0, ..., ~QT }
and Algorithm 2 is able to -approximate the solutions.
Algorithm 2 MGE-F
1: {Rj , Rj,F }, T, 
2: for j = 1, ...,M do
3: V Tj ← Rj,F
4: end for
5: Initialize: ~Q0, ~Q1
6: for κ = T − 1, ..., 0 do
7: s = 0
8: while maxj ||Qs+1j −Qsj || ≥  do
9: for i = 1, ...,M do
10: Qs+1i ← Ui(Qs−i, V κ+1i )
11: end for
12: s← s+ 1
13: end while
14: ~Q0 ← ~Qs
15: for j = 1, ...,M do
16: Q̂κj ← Uj(Q0−j , V κ+1j )
17: V κj ← Epiκj [Q̂κj ]
18: end for
19: end for
5 Special Setting
In many applications, the interactions among the agents can be summarized to not-colliding or
colliding (not merging/merging into a same state) in a common environment. Example of a not
colliding scenario is a set of self-driving cars in a highway and an example of colliding scenario is two
robots exchanging their loads in a warehouse. The need for such model is to reduce the complexity
of the inference algorithms in the previous section. In this section, we introduce a simplified Markov
game that can model such scenarios. This game has lower complexity and requires less memory
compared to the games in Section 4. For the rest of this section, we assume that all agents have the
same state space X .
The main idea of this model is to assume that the reward function of agent i in (7) can be factorized
into two terms: the individual goal of the agent that unlike Ri(~x, ai) in (7) depends only on (xi, ai)
and another term that encodes the interactions between i and its opponents. The latter term should
depends only on the existence probability of i’s opponents at state xi. Therefore, we define the
occupancy measure Oτj (xi) : X → [0, 1] to denote the likelihood of agent j being at state xi at time
τ .
With this assumption, we redefine the Q-function of agent i at time τ , which now, it only depends on
i’s state and action. More precisely, we define
Q˜τi (xi, ai) := Ri(xi, ai)+Ψ
(
Oτ−i(xi)
)
+E[V˜ τ+1i (x)|xi, ai], (9)
where Oτ−i(xi) := {Oτ1 (xi), ..., OτM (xi)} \ {Oτi (xi)}, and Ψ(·) is a functional6. The expectation is
taken over the probabilistic state transitions. The value-function is defined similar to (7),
V˜ τ+1i (x) := Epiτ+1i [Q˜
τ+1
i (x; a)], (10)
6As an example, in the self-driving car scenario, a possible choice for Ψ(Oτ−i(xi)) is −
∑
j∈−i µjO
τ
j (xi),
where µj > 0.
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Figure 2: Left: Graphical model demonstrating the dependencies between variables in algorithm 3
with two agents {i, j} and T = 2. Here, k denotes the kth iteration of the algorithm. Right: State
space and possible actions of the pursuit game. Red and black arrows including self-loop for every
node indicate the possible actions of the hunter and the prey, respectively.
and V˜ Ti (x) = Ri,F (x), where Ri,F (x) denotes the final reward of agent i at state x. The policy
piτi = Exp{Q˜τi } is defined similar to (2). The above equations lead to
Q˜τi = Ri +Ψ(O
τ
−i)+ EExp{Q˜τ+1i }[Q˜
τ+1
i ]
:= Bi(O
τ
−i, Q˜
τ+1
i ), for i ∈ [M ], (11)
This equation describes the dependency between the Q-function and the occupancy measures. On the
other hand, the occupancy measure can be written recursively as follows
Oτ+1i (x) =
∑
x′,a
piτi (a|x′)P (x|x′, a)Oτi (x′) =EExp{Q˜τi }[O
τ
i ]
:= Gi(O
τ
i , Q˜
τ
i ), for i ∈ [M ], (12)
and the boundary condition O0i = δi, where δi denotes the delta function that is zero everywhere
except at the current state of agent i. By assuming that agents are aware of each others goals (reward
functions {Rj , Rj,F }j∈[M ] are known to all the agents), we propose a forward-backward algorithm
in 3 that outputs the Q-functions of the agents. In the forward-pass of Algorithm 3, the occupancy
measures {Oτi } are updated using (12) and afterward, they are used in the backward-pass to update the
Q-functions via (11). Figure 2 demonstrates the dependencies between the variables of a two-players
system with T = 2.
Algorithm 3 MGE-FB
1: {Rj , Rj,F }, T,K
2: Initialize: {Q˜0j}, ..., {Q˜Tj }
3: for j = 1, ...,M do
4: O0j ← δj , Q˜T+1j ← Rj,F
5: end for
6: for k = 1, ...,K do
7: Forward-pass:
8: for τ = 1, ..., T and j = 1, ...,M do
9: Oτj ← Gj(Oτ−1j , Q˜τ−1j )
10: end for
11: Backward-pass:
12: for τ = T − 1, ..., 0 and i = 1, ...,M do
13: Q˜τi ← Bi(Oτ−i, Q˜τ+1i )
14: end for
15: end for
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Next result introduces a condition under which Algorithm 3 converges to a set of unique Q-functions
as the number of iterations K tends to infinity. To establish this result, we assume that there is a
constant7 L such that for any pairs of occupancy measures O,O : X → [0, 1] and ∀ i ∈ [M ],
||Ψ(O−i)−Ψ(O−i)||∞ ≤ Lmax
j∈−i
||Oj −Oj ||1.
Furthermore, we assume that there exist constants ω and ϕ such that maxi{||Ri||∞, ||Ri,F ||∞} ≤ ω
and ||Ψ||∞ ≤ ϕ and let ξ := (T + 1)(ω + ϕ).
Theorem 3. Under the above assumptions, Algorithm 3 converges as K tends to infinity when
2LT ≤ ξ exp(−β(T + 1)ξ).
6 Multi-agent Maximum Causal Entropy
In the above formulation of the Markov games, it is assumed that the agents are aware of all the reward
functions. However, this may not be the case in some problems. In order to relax this assumption,
we establish the connection between Markov games with exploration strategies and the principle
of maximum causal entropy (MCE). Then, we show how this connection can be used to relax the
aforementioned assumption.
The principle of MCE prescribes a policy by maximizing the entropy of a sequence of actions causally
conditioned on sequentially revealed side information Ziebart [2010]. The original formulation of
MCE is for single-agent setting but the multi-agent extension of MCE is also introduced in Ziebart
et al. [2011]. The problem of MCE in multi-agent setting is as follows,
max
{piτi }
H(~a||~x) := −E~a,~x
[∑
τ≤T
log piτ (~a(t)|~x(t))
]
,
s.t. Eai,~x[Fi(~x, ai)] = Êai,~x[Fi(~x, ai)], ∀i,∑
ai(τ)∈A
piτi (ai(τ)|~x(τ))=1, ∀ τ, i, ~x(τ),
piτi (ai(τ)|~x(τ)) ≥ 0, ∀ τ, i, ai(τ), ~x(τ),
(13)
The first constraint is to ensure that for any agent i, the expectation of the feature function Fi =
(Fi,1, ..., Fi,Ni) matches its empirical mean Êai,~x[Fi(~x, ai)]. The feature functions are revealed as
side information to all agents. Next results describe the solution of (13).
Theorem 4. Solution of (13) is recursively given by
piτi =
1
Zi(τ)
exp
(
W τi (~x(τ), ai(τ))
)
,
W τi (~x(τ), ai(τ)) =< θi, Fi(~x(τ), ai(τ)) > +Epiτ−i [logZi(τ+1)],
logZi(τ) = softmax
a′∈A
W τi (~x(τ), a
′),
logZi(T ) = softmax
a∈A
< θi, Fi(~x(T ), a) >,
where piτ−i =
∏
j∈−i pi
τ
j . The boundary condition is Zi(T + 1) = 1 for all the agents.
This result resembles the setting of our Markov games with exploration strategies; W τi (~x(τ), ai(τ))
plays the role of Q-function in (7) but with the difference that softmax is been used to define the
value-function instead of the expectation in (7). < θi, Fi(~x(τ), ai(τ)) > is the reward function, and
piτi is the policy and it is distributed according to the Boltzmann distribution with β = 1.
An important consequence of this result is to be able to develop a gradient-based algorithm similar to
the MCE-IRL Ziebart et al. [2008], Bloem and Bambos [2014] or an online inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL) algorithm similar to Rhinehart and Kitani [2017] that can simultaneously infer the
rewards and the policies. Such algorithm requires the gradient function that is given below.
7 For the choice of Ψ(Oτ−i(xi)) = −
∑
j∈−i µjO
τ
j (xi) and when the state space X is discrete, we have
L =
∑
j µj .
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Theorem 5. The gradient of the dual problem with respect to θi is given by Ê[Fi(~x, ai)] −
E[Fi(~x, ai)].
Algorithm 4 Online MMCE-IRL for agent i
1: initialize: {θj}
2: for j ∈ −i do
3: F˜ (τ)j ←
∑
(~x,aj)∈Ht Fj(~x, aj)
4: R(τ)j ←< θj , Fj >
5: end for
6: ~pi ← MGE({R(τ)j : j ∈ −i}, Ri)
7: for j ∈ [M ] do
8: F¯j ← E~pi[Fj ]
9: θj ← Project||θj ||≤B
(
θj − %(F˜ (τ)j − F¯j)
)
10: end for
Algorithm 4 summarizes the steps of an online inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) approach for
agent i in which this agent infers the individual rewards of its opponent by observing their behavior
and knowing its own reward function. Similar to Rhinehart and Kitani [2017], we include a projection
step to ensure that the reward functions are bounded. In Algorithm 3, Ht denotes the trajectories up
to time t, i.e., pairs of states and actions and % is the step size of the gradient descent.
7 Experimental Results
This section summarizes different settings where we evaluated the performance of our algorithms.
Pursuit Game: The pursuit problem has been widely examined in multi-agent systems Weinberg
and Rosenschein [2004]. We used different variants of this problem in our experiments: First, we
consider two agents; one hunter (h) and one prey (p). Figure 2 illustrates the state space (nodes of
the graph) and the possible actions of the agents. The red and black arrows indicate the possible
actions for the hunter and the prey, respectively. Each agent can choose to stay at its current position
or follow one of its corresponding arrows. This game is deterministic, i.e., specifying the states and
the actions, the next state of the agents are known with probability one. The agents can observe the
current position of their opponent and they move simultaneously. The goal of the predator is to hunt
the prey during a time horizon of length T = 22.
This is a Markov game in which −Rp(xh, xp, ap) = Rh(xh, xp, ah) = 0.4, when xh = xp ∈
{0, 1, ..., 8} and zero, otherwise. A similar but simpler variant of this game was studied by Weinberg
and Rosenschein [2004] in which both agents play on the same grid and the prey moves left or up
at random. The output of MGE-F is a set of time-dependent mixed strategies but we assumed that
the agents only executed the actions with the maximum probabilities. In this case, the average score
of the hunter and its average number of hunts using MGE-F during 10 games with random initial
states were 1.16 and 2.9, respectively. We compared the performance of our algorithm with NSCP in
Weinberg and Rosenschein [2004] for which both players used the NSCP to learn their policies. The
results of NSCP were 0.84 and 2.1.
In the second variant, we consider three agents; two hunters {h1, h2} and one prey {p}. They move
on the same graph as in Figure 2 but unlike the previous setting, they can either stay at their current
position or move according to the red arrows. The hunters have only T = 3 steps to catch the prey
without colliding with each other. We used the following reward for h1,
Rh1(xh1 , xh2 , xp, ah1) =

0 xh1 6∈ {xh2 , xp}
−15/4 xh1 = xh2 6= xp
−10/4 xh1 = xh2 = xp
+5/4 xh1 = xp 6= xh2 .
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Figure 3: Effect of α on the convergence speed of the modified updating rule in (14) for the second
variant of the pursuit game.
Figure 4: The learned mixed policies for the first move of h1 and p in the pursuit games with three
players.
The reward of the second hunter was defined similarly, and the prey’s reward was given by
Rp(xh1 , xh2 , xp, ah1) = 0, when xp 6∈ {xh1 , xh2} and -1/8, otherwise.
To relax the assumption of Theorem 7, we modified the update rule of MGE-F. More precisely,
we reduced the exploration property of the agents by adding a portion of the previously estimated
Q-function to the new Q-function, i.e., instead of line 10 of MGE-F, we used
Qs+1i ← αUi(Qs−i, V t+κ+1i ) + (1− α)Qsi , (14)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Note that α = 1 leads to the same update rule as in MGE-F. This modification
will not disturb the convergence of the algorithm as long as γαb + (1− α) < 1, where γαb denotes
the contraction coefficient of Ui when αmaxj{||Rj ||∞} ≤ b. Thus, by selecting proper α, the
convergence can be guaranteed for reward functions that have norms greater than the bound in
Theorem 7. The cost for this relaxation is losing the convergence speed. Figure 3 shows the
convergence error for the second variant of the pursuit game when α ∈ {0.05, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6}. All
different values of α led to the same set of policies. In all the experiments in this section, we used
β = 1.
Table in Figure 4 presents the learned policies for the first moves of h1 and p, when the initial states
are I1 := {h1 ∈ 0, h2 ∈ 8, p ∈ 4}8 and I2 := {h1 ∈ 0, h2 ∈ 8, p ∈ 2}.
Another interesting variant of this game is when the initial states of the players are {h1 ∈ 1, h2 ∈
5, p ∈ 2} and T = 1, i.e., each player can only execute one action. As we expected, the output of
MGE-F was that the best action9 for each player is not to move. This behavior can be explained using
the predictive ability of the players.
8h1 is at node 0, h2 is at node 8 and the prey is at node 4.
9Action with the maximum probability.
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Figure 5: Upper left: Initial states of the grid game (II). G denotes the goal of both agents. They can
successfully pass the barriers with probability 0.5. Upper right: The state space of the rabbit-hole
game. Table: Average scores of the players in grid games.
Rabbit-Hole Game: This is also a pursuit game in which a fox chasing a rabbit over a grid, Figure
5. There is a prize +0.3 for the rabbit in a small hole. Both rabbit and fox can enter the hole. Fox will
gain +2 points, when it catches the rabbit and the rabbit loses 2 points. Each agent has only 12 moves.
We modeled this game using a finite-time horizon SG with T = 12, and learned the policies using
MGE-F. Interestingly, the behavior of the learned policies was that with high probability, the rabbit
entered the hole when it knew that the fox is far enough from the entrance and the fox moved such
that its distance to the rabbit and the entrance is minimized. The average scores of the rabbit and the
fox after playing 10 rounds with random initial states were 0.06 and 0, respectively.
Grid Games: We also studied the behavior of our learning algorithm in two different grid games all
of which are two-player games: (I) a stochastic game, Figure 1 and (II) a cooperative game that is
the stochastic version of the Battle of Sexes, Figure 5. In (I), agents are rewarded +30, when they
reached their goals and punished -1, when they collided. In (II), both agents wish to reach G without
collision, but if they try to go over the barrier (indicated by curves in Figure 5), they may fail with
probability 0.5. The reward at G was +2 and the collision cost was losing one point.
We compared our algorithm with three algorithms in Greenwald et al. [2003]. The selected algorithms
(Q-learning, uCE-Q, lCE-Q) were trained by repeatedly playing the games. As it is discussed in
Greenwald et al. [2003], they all converge to a symmetric Nash equilibrium in (I) and asymmetric
Nash equilibrium in (II). It is important to mention that the main difference between MGE and the
algorithms in Greenwald et al. [2003] is that they learn the best-response policies for the agents but
MGE learns the exploration policies. Table in Figure 5 shows the average scores of different learning
algorithms after playing the games 1000 times.
Driving Scene: In this experiment, we simulated a driving scene in which 4 agents (three vehicles
and a pedestrian) interact at a road junction. The initial positions and the corresponding goals of
the agents are illustrated in Figure 6. In this experiment, the states and the actions are discrete,
i.e., agents can choose to stay or move to one of their neighboring cells. This complex multi-agent
scenario is quite interesting for self-driving cars application. We used Algorithm 3 (MGE-FB) with
Ψ(Oτ−i(xi)) = −
∑
j∈−i µjO
τ
j (xi). Actions with the maximum probabilities are: all cars stop
before the zebra crossing while the pedestrian walks toward its destination. Then, car 2 drives towards
its goal. Cars 1 and 3 are the next agents that drive to their goals, respectively. All the agents select
their shortest routes. These behaviors match human driving.
8 Discussion
We developed several multi-agent algorithms in which the agents use exploration policies while
considering their opponent’s strategies. We showed the convergence of our algorithms and also
evaluated their learning behavior using several game-theoretic examples. A possible future work
is extending the presented results to continuous state-action spaces. This is of great importance for
several applications such as robotic and self-driving cars.
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Figure 6: Initial state of the driving scene. Goals are indicated by circles, e.g., car 1 wants to go to
circle 1.
Supplementary Materials
Theorem 6. Assume that maxi ||Ri||∞ ≤ (1−γ)
2
2Mγβ . Then, for every i ∈ [M ], Ti is a contraction
mapping.
Theorem 7. If for every i, max{||Ri||∞, ||Ri,F ||∞} ≤ 1/(2β(M − 1)(1 + T )), then the system of
equation in (6) admits a unique solution.
Theorem 8. Suppose that . Then, Algorithm 3 converges to a set of unique Q-functions as the
number of iterations K tends to infinity.
Theorem 9. Solution of the multi-agent MCE (7) is recursively given by
piτi =
1
Zi(τ)
exp
(
W τi (~x(τ), ai(τ))
)
,
W τi (~x(τ), ai(τ))=θ
T
i Fi(~x(τ), ai(τ))+Epiτ−i[logZi(τ+1)],
logZi(τ)=softmax
a′
W τi (~x(τ), a
′),
logZi(T ) = softmax
a∈A
θTi Fi(~x(T ), a),
where pit−i =
∏
j∈−i pi
t
j . The boundary condition is Zi(T + 1) = 1 for all the agents.
Theorem 10. The gradient of the dual with respect to θi is given by
E˜[Fi(~x, ai)]− E[Fi(~x, ai)].
In order to establish the above results, we require the following results. For simplicity, in the
remaining, we use || · || to denote || · ||∞.
Lemma 1. Let X = [x1, ..., xn] ∈ Rn. There exists 0 < α < 1, such that
1
2
∑
j,i
λiλj |exi − exj | ≤ α||X||
(∑
k
λke
xk
)
, (15)
where 0 < λi < 1 and
∑
k λk = 1.
Proof. We prove this by induction on n. First step is when n = 2. In this case, the left hand side of
(15) becomes λ(1− λ)|ex2 − ex1 |. Without loss of generality, assume x2 ≥ x1. We will show that
there exists an α such that the function below is positive for x2 − x1 = x ≥ 0,
gα(x) := 2αmax{|x1 + x|, |x1|} (λex + (1− λ))− 2λ(1− λ)(ex − 1).
If Since 2 max{|x1 + x|, |x1|} ≥ |x|, we can show that gα(x) is positive, if hα(x) is positive,
hα(x) := αx (λe
x + (1− λ))− 2λ(1− λ)(ex − 1).
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This is straightforward, because for 1 > α > (1−λ) max{1, 2λ}, we have hα(0) = 0, ∂hα(0)/∂x >
0, and ∂2hα(x)/∂x2 ≥ 0.
Induction hypothesis; for any vector Z ∈ Rn, there exists an α such that (15) holds. Let X ∈ Rn+1
such that |xn+1| = ||X||, and define xn+1 := x∗. By induction hypothesis, we have∑
j,i≤n
λiλj |eyi − eyj | ≤2(1− λ)α∗||Y ||
∑
k≤n
λke
yk ,
where Y := [xn, ..., x1] ∈ Rn, in which the zero entry is removed. Therefore, to prove the n+ 1st
step, we need to show that
2(1− λ)α∗||Y ||
∑
k≤n
λke
yk + 2λ
∑
i≤n
λi|eyi − ex∗ | ≤ 2α||X||(
∑
k≤n
λke
yk + λe∗). (16)
Let 1 > α ≥ α∗, and note that ||Y || ≤ ||X|| = |x∗|. Therefore, we can prove (16) by showing
0 ≤ α|x∗|(
∑
k≤n
λ˜ke
yk +
ex
∗
1− λ )−
∑
i≤n
λ˜i|eyi − ex∗ |. (17)
where λ˜i := λk1−λ . Note that
∑
k λ˜k = 1. Without loss of generality, let y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn. Since
|x∗| ≥ ||Y ||, there are only two possible scenarios: I) x∗ ≥ 0, then −x∗ ≤ y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn ≤ x∗ or II)
x∗ < 0 in which, we have x∗ ≤ y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn ≤ −x∗.
I) In this case, the right hand side of (17) can be bounded by
(αx∗ + 1)
∑
k≤n
λ˜ke
yk + αx∗
ex
∗
1− λ − e
x∗ ≥ (αx∗ + 1)e−x∗ + αx∗ e
x∗
1− λ − e
x∗ := Jα(x
∗).
We show that there exists 0 < α < 1 such that for all x∗ > 0, ex
∗
Jα(x
∗) ≥ 0. Because Jα(0) = 0,
∂ex
∗
Jα(x
∗)/∂x∗ is α+ α/(1− λ)− 2 for x∗ = 0, and
∂2ex
∗
Jα(x
∗)
∂(x∗)2
∣∣∣
x∗=0
=
(
4
α
1− λ − 4 +
4αx∗
1− λ
)
e2x
∗
,
selecting 1 > α ≥ max{1− λ, 2−2λ2−λ }, we have Jα(x∗) ≥ 0.
II) Suppose x∗ = −x < 0. In this case, the right hand side of (17) becomes
(αx− 1)
∑
k≤n
λ˜ke
yk + αx∗
e−x
1− λ + e
−x.
Clearly, the above equation is positive if αx − 1 > 0, otherwise, it is bounded by the following
function
hα(x) := (αx− 1)ex + αx
1− λe
−x + e−x.
We show there exists an α < 1 such that rα(x) := hα(x)ex is positive for all αx < 1. This is true
because of the following facts
rα(0) = 0,
∂rα(x)
∂x
∣∣
x=0
= α+
α
1− λ − 2,
min
x
∂rα(x)
∂x
= −αe 2(1−α)α + α
1− λ.
Since minx
∂rα(x)
∂x is a monotone increasing function of α and it is positive for α = 1, there exists
α¯ < 1, such that minx ∂rα¯(x)/∂x ≥ 0. Hence, rα¯(x) ≥ 0 for αx < 1. This concludes the
results.
Lemma 2. Let Q, Q˜ ∈ Rn, then there exists an 0 < α < 1, such that
||Expβ(Q)− Expβ(Q˜)||1 ≤ 2βα||Q− Q˜||∞, (18)
where Expβ([q1, ..., qn]) := [eβq1 , ..., eβqn ]/(
∑
i e
βqi).
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Proof. Suppose that Q˜ = Q+X ,
||Expβ(Q)− Expβ(Q˜)||1 =
∑
i
∣∣∣∣ eβqi∑
k e
βqk
− e
βqi+βxi∑
k e
βqk+βxk
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
i
eβqi∑
k e
βqk
∣∣∣∣∣∣1− e
βxi∑
k
eβqk∑
j e
βqj
eβxk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
i
λi
∣∣∣∣1− eβxi∑
k λke
βxk
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1∑
k λje
βxj
∑
i,k
λiλk
∣∣eβxi − eβxk ∣∣ ,
where λi := e
βqi∑
k e
βqk
. Applying Lemma 1 will imply the result.
Lemma 3. For two probability measures u and v defined over a countable space, we have
sup
||f ||≤c
∣∣∣Eu[f ]− Ev[f ]∣∣∣ ≤ c||u− v||1.
8.1 Proof of Theorem 6
To conclude the result, first, we show that for any fixed Qi there exists 0 ≤ α < 1 independent of Qi,
such that
|Ti(Q−i, Qi)− Ti(Q˜−i, Qi)| ≤ Biγ
1− γ 2αβ(M − 1) maxj∈−i ||Qj − Q˜j ||. (19)
Second, we show that for any fixed Q−i,
|Ti(Q−i, Q˜i)− Ti(Q−i, Q˜i)| ≤ (γ + Biγ
1− γ 2αβ)||Qi − Q˜i||. (20)
To show (19), we start with the definition of Ti that is
Ti(Q−i, Qi) := Ri+γEExpβ{Q−i}
[
Vi
]
, (21)
where Vi = EExpβ{Qi}[Qi] and the expectation in (21) is taken with respect to the policies of players
−i. The left hand side of (19) can be written as follows,
|Ti(Q−i, Qi)− Ti(Q˜−i, Qi)| = γ
∣∣∣EExpβ{Q−i}[Vi]− EExpβ{Q˜−i}[Vi]∣∣∣.
Notice that if ||Ri|| ≤ Bi for some Bi, then ||Vi|| ≤ Bi(1 + γ + · · · ) = Bi/(1 − γ). Using the
result of Lemma 3, the right hand side of the above equation can be bounded as follows
γ
∣∣∣EExpβ{Q−i}[Vi]− EExpβ{Q˜−i}[Vi]∣∣∣ ≤ Biγ1− γ ||Expβ{Q−i} − Expβ{Q˜−i}||1, (22)
Given the result of Lemma 2, there exists an 0 < α < 1 such that the right hand side of the above
inequality can be bounded by
Biγ
1− γ 2αβ||Q−i − Q˜−i||.
Note that Q−i =
⊕
j∈−iQj , where ~u
⊕
~v = [un + vm] for 1 ≤ n ≤ |~u| and 1 ≤ m ≤ |~v|.
Therefore,
||Q−i − Q˜−i|| ≤ (M − 1) max
j∈−i
||Qj − Q˜j ||.
This concludes the inequality in (19).
In order to prove (20), we have
|Ti(Q−i, Qi)− Ti(Q−i, Q˜i)| = γ
∣∣∣EExpβ(Qi)EExpβ{Q−i}[Qi]− EExpβ(Q˜i)EExpβ{Q−i}[Q˜i]∣∣∣
≤ γ
∣∣∣EExpβ(Qi)EExpβ{Q−i}[Qi]− EExpβ(Qi)EExpβ{Q−i}[Q˜i]∣∣∣+ γ∣∣∣EExpβ(Qi)[φ]− EExpβ(Q˜i)[φ]∣∣∣
≤ γ||Qi − Q˜i||+ Biγ
1− γ 2αβ||Qi − Q˜i||,
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where φ := EExpβ{Q−i}[Q˜i]. The last inequality is obtained similar to the proof of (19) and the fact
that E[g] ≤ ||g||.
Final step is to combine (19) and (20).
|Ti(Q−i, Qi)− Ti(Q˜−i, Q˜i)| ≤ |Ti(Q−i, Qi)− Ti(Q−i, Q˜i)|+ |Ti(Q−i, Q˜i)− Ti(Q˜−i, Q˜i)|
≤ (γ + Biγ
1− γ 2αβM)||Q− Q˜||.
In the above equation ||Q−Q˜|| = maxk ||Qk−Q˜k||. This shows that Ti is contraction ifBi < (1−γ)
2
2Mγαβ
in the infinite-time horizon problem.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 7
We prove the result by showing that, if ||Ri,F ||, ||Ri|| are bounded, there exists 0 ≤ α < 1, such that
|Ui(Qt−i, V t+1i )− Ui(Q˜t−i, V t+1i )| ≤ Ci(T + 1)2αβ(M − 1) max
j∈−i
||Qj − Q˜j ||∞.
This inequality is analogous to (19) and can be shown similarly by applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
and keeping in mind that if ||Ri|| ≤ Ci for some Ci, then ||Qi|| ≤ Ci(T + 1).
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We prove this statement by showing that there exists an α ∈ [0, 1) such that for any agent i and any t,
||Qti,k+1 −Qti,k||∞ ≤ α||Qti,k −Qti,k−1||∞. (23)
where ||Q− Q˜||∞ := supx supa |Q(x, a)− Q˜(x, a)|. As a reminder, we have
Qti,k = Bi(O
t
−i,k−1, Q
t+1
i,k ) = Ri + Ψ(O
t
−i,k−1)+ EExp(Qt+1i,k )[Q
t+1
i,k ], (24)
Oti,k = G(Q
t−1
i,k , O
t−1
i,k ) = EExp(Qt−1j,k )[O
t−1
j,k ], (25)
Inequality (23) and the result of Lemma 6 conclude the result. To show (23), let
∆tk := ||Qtk −Qtk−1||∞,
Λtk := ||Otk −Otk−1||1,
in which for simplicity, the index corresponding to the agent is dropped. Using the update equations
in Algorithm 3, i.e., Equation 11 of the main paper, and Lemma 7, we obtain
∆tk ≤ LΛtk−1 + S∆t+1k , (26)
∆Tk ≤ LΛTk−1, (27)
where S := (1 + ξβ) is given in Lemma 7.
On the other hand, using Equation 12 of the main paper, we have
Λtk = ||G(Qt−1k , Ot−1k )−G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k−1)||1
≤ ||G(Qt−1k , Ot−1k )−G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k )||1 + ||G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k )−G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k−1)||1.
Given the results of Lemma 4, we have
Λtk ≤ 2β∆t−1k + Λt−1k , (28)
Λ0k = 0. (29)
From the inequalities in (26)-(29), we obtain
∆tk ≤ L
(
T−t∑
j=0
SjΛt+jk−1
)
,
Λtk−1 ≤ 2β
(
t−1∑
i=0
∆t−i−1k−1
)
.
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Combining the above inequalities implies
∆tk ≤ 2Lβ
T−t∑
j=0
Sj
t+j−1∑
i=0
∆t+j−i−1k−1 ≤ 2Lβ∆k−1
T−t∑
j=0
t+j−1∑
i=0
Sj
(a)
≤ 2Lβ∆k−1
T∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=0
Sj
= 2Lβ∆k−1S
TST+1 − (T + 1)ST + 1
(S − 1)2 ≤ 2Lβ∆k−1S
STT
(S − 1) ≤ ∆k−1
2LT
ξ
eβ(T+1)ξ.
where ∆k−1 := max0≤τ≤T ∆τk−1. Inequality (a) is due to the fact that S > 1. To obtain
convergence, we require the coefficient of ∆k−1 to be less than one. Therefore, we obtain
2LT ≤ ξe−β(T+1)ξ.
Lemma 4. We have
||G(Qt−1k , Ot−1k )−G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k )||1 ≤ 2β∆t−1k ,
||G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k )−G(Qt−1k−1, Ot−1k−1)||1 ≤ Λt−1k .
Proof. Using the definition of transformation U , the left hand side can be written as follows∫
x
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x′
∑
a
(
pit−1k (a|x′)− pit−1k−1(a|x′)
)
P (x|x′, a)Ot−1k (x′)dx′
∣∣∣∣∣ dx (30)
≤
∫
x
∫
x′
∑
a
∣∣pit−1k (a|x′)− pit−1k−1(a|x′)∣∣P (x|x′, a)Ot−1k (x′)dx′dx
=
∫
x′
∑
a
∣∣pit−1k (a|x′)− pit−1k−1(a|x′)∣∣Ot−1k (x′)dx′
where pit−1k (a|x′) ∝ exp(βQt−1k (x′, a)). Based on the result of Lemma 2, we can bound the above
difference as follows,∫
x′
2β||Qt−1k (x′, ·)−Qt−1k−1(x′, ·)||∞Ot−1k (x′)dx′ ≤ 2β||Qt−1k −Qt−1k−1||∞ = 2β∆t−1k .
The left hand side of the second inequality is∫
x
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x′
∑
a
pit−1k−1(a|x′)P (x|x′, a)
(
Ot−1k (x
′)−Ot−1k−1(x′)
)
dx′
∣∣∣∣∣ dx
≤
∫
x
∫
x′
∑
a
pit−1k−1(a|x′)P (x|x′, a)
∣∣Ot−1k (x′)−Ot−1k−1(x′)∣∣ dx′dx
=
∫
x′
∣∣Ot−1k (x′)−Ot−1k−1(x′)∣∣ dx′ = Λt−1k .
Lemma 5. For a given vectors α = (α1, ..., αn), let
fα(Q) :=
∑
j
exp(βqj)αj∑
i exp(βqi)
,
where Q = (q1, ..., qn). Then, for any two arbitrary vectors Q and Q˜, we have
|fα(Q)− fα(Q˜)| ≤ β||α||d
2
||Q− Q˜||∞. (31)
where ||α||d := maxi,j |αi − αj |.
Proof. The norm of the gradient of fα(·) is given by
||∇fα||1 =
∑
j
|∑i β(αj − αi) exp(β(qi + qj))|
(
∑
i exp(βqi))
2
.
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The right hand side of the above inequality can be written as∑
j
bj
∑
i β(αj − αi) exp(β(qi + qj))
(
∑
i exp(βqi))
2
,
where bj ∈ {−1, 1} specifies the sign of the term within the absolute-value. Without loss of generality,
we assume that α1 ≤ ... ≤ αn. In this case, bn = 1 and b1 = −1 but the rest of bjs cannot be
specified only based on αjs. We define matrix A ∈ Rn×n, such that Ai,j = (αi − αj), then
||∇fα||1 = β (b ◦ exp(βQ))
TA exp(βQ)
|| exp(βQ)||21
≤ β max
b′∈{0,1}n
(b′ ◦ exp(βQ))TA exp(βQ)
|| exp(βQ)||21
, (32)
where b ◦ exp(βQ) = (b1 exp(βq1), ..., bn exp(βqn)). Let us define
%b′ := (b
′ ◦ exp(βQ))TA exp(βQ) = exp(βQ)TAb′ exp(βQ),
where Ab′ is matrix A in which ith row is multiplied by b′i. In this case,
2%b′ = exp(βQ)
T (Ab′ +A
T
b′) exp(βQ).
Note that A + AT = 0, and hence the absolute value of the (i, j)th entry of Ab′ + ATb′ is zero iff
b′ib
′
j = 1, otherwise it is at most 2|αi − αj |. Therefore, Ab′ + ATb′ has most non-zero entries iff
exactly half of b′ is +1 and the other half is -1. Let I1 and I2 denote the indices that b′i are +1 and -1,
respectively and |I1| = bn/2c, |I2| = dn/2e . Therefore, we obtain
2%b′ ≤ 2
∑
i∈I1
∑
j∈I2
2|αi − αj | exp(β(qi + qj)) ≤ 4||α||d
∑
i∈I1
∑
j∈I2
exp(β(qi + qj))
= 4||α||d
(∑
i∈I1
exp(βqi)
)(∑
j∈I2
exp(βqj)
)
. (33)
Using the definition of %b′ , Equations (32) and (33), we have
||∇fα||1 ≤ βmax
b′
%b′ ≤ β||α||d max
I1,I2
2
(∑
i∈I1 exp(βqi)
)(∑
j∈I2 exp(βqj)
)
(∑
i∈I1 exp(βqi) +
∑
j∈I2 exp(βqj)
)2 ≤ β ||α||d2 .
The rest follows by the mean-value theorem, the fact that fα is a continuous function of Q, and
Ho¨lder inequality.
Lemma 6. For a given sequence {an}∞n=1, if there exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that
|an − an−1| ≤ α|an−1 − an−2|, ∀n ≥ 1, (34)
then an converges.
Lemma 7. Function g(Q) := EExp(Q)[Q] is Lipschitz with the constant S := (1 + ξβ), where
||Q||∞ ≤ ξ, and β is the inverse temperature.
Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 5 and the fact that maxi,j |αi − αj | ≤ 2||α||∞. Note that
|g(Q)− g(Q˜)| ≤
∣∣∣EExp(Q)[Q]− EExp(Q˜)[Q]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣EExp(Q˜)[Q]− EExp(Q˜)[Q˜]∣∣∣
≤ (β||Q||∞ + 1)||Q− Q˜||∞,
where ||Q||∞ := supx supa |Q(x, a)|.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 9
Differentiating the Lagrangian of the problem in 13 of the main paper,
Γ = H(~a||~x) +
∑
i,k
∑
τ
θk,i
(
E[Fi,k(~x(τ), ai(τ))]− E˜[Fi,k(~x(τ), ai(τ))]
)
+
∑
i,τ
∑
C
(i)
ai(τ),~aτ−1,~xτ
pi(ai(τ)|~aτ−1, ~xτ )+
∑
i,τ
∑
D
(i)
~aτ−1,~xτ
∑
ai(τ)
pi(ai(τ)|~aτ−1, ~xτ )−1
 ,
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implies
∂Γ
∂pi(ai(t)|~at−1, ~xt) = C
(i)
ai(t),~at−1,~xt
+D
(i)
~at−1,~xt −
∑
~a−i(t)
P (~at, ~xt)
pi(ai(t)|~at−1, ~xt)−∑
τ≥t
∑ ∂P (~aτ , ~xτ )
∂pi(ai(t)|~at−1, ~xt) log pi(~a(τ)|~a
τ−1, ~xτ ) +
∑
j,k
θk,j
∑
τ≥t
∑ ∂P (~aτ , ~xτ )
∂pi(ai(t)|~at−1, ~xt)Fj,k(~x(τ), aj(τ)),
where for τ ≥ t,
∂P (~aτ , ~xτ )
∂pi(ai(t)|~at−1, ~xt) =
pi(~a(t)|~at−1, ~xt)
pi(ai(t)|~at−1, ~xt)P (~a
t−1, ~xt)P (~aτt+1, ~x
τ
t+1|~at, ~xt).
For simplicity, we denote pi(aj(τ)|~aτ−1, ~xτ ) and pi(~a(τ)|~aτ−1, ~xτ ) by pij(τ) and pi(τ), respectively.
By equating the derivative of the Lagrangian to zero, we obtain
C
(i)
ai(t),~at−1,~xt
+D
(i)
~at−1,~xt = P (~a
t−1, ~xt)
(
1 +
∑
~a−i(t)
pi−i(t) log pi−i(t) + log pii(t)+
∑
τ>t
∑
~a−i(t)
pi−i(t) E [log pi(τ)
∣∣ ~at, ~xt]−∑
j,k
θk,j
∑
τ≥t
∑
~a−i(t)
pi−i(t) E [Fj,k(~x(τ), aj(τ))
∣∣ ~at, ~xt]),
where pi−i(t) =
∏
j∈−i pij(t). The above equation suggests the following form for agent’s i policy at
time T ,
log pii(T ) = exp
(
θTi Fi(~x(T ), ai(T ))− softmax
a′
θTi Fi(~x(T ), a
′)
)
∀ i,
log pii(T − 1) ∝ exp
(
θTi Fi(~x(T − 1), ai(T − 1)) +
∑
~a−i(T−1)
pi−i(T − 1)
P (~x−i(T )|~x−i(T − 1),~a−i(T − 1))
[
softmax
a′
θTi fi(~x(T ), a
′
i(T ))
]) ∀ i,
...
where θi = [θ1,i, ..., θK,i] and Fi = [Fi,1, ..., Fi,K ]T .
8.5 Proof of Theorem 10
We have
H(~a||~x) =
∑
t≤T
E~xt,~at [− log pit(a(t)|~x(t))] = −
∑
t≤T
∑
i
E~xt,~at [θTi Fi(~x(t), ai(t))]
−
T−1∑
t=1
∑
i
E~xt+1,~at [softmaxW t+1i (H
t+1, a)] +
T∑
t=1
∑
i
E~xt,~at−1 [softmaxW ti (~x(t), a)]
= −
∑
t≤T
∑
i
E~xt,~at [θTi Fi(~x(t), ai(t))] +
∑
i
E~x1 [softmaxW 1i (H1, a)]. (35)
On the other hand, we have
E~x(t)[∇θj softmaxW ti (~x(t), a)] = E[
∑
a
piti(a|~x(t))∇θjW ti (~x(t), a)] = E~x(t)∪ai(t)[∇θjW ti (~x(t), a)].
Using the above equality, for any deterministic function Φ, we have
E~x(t)
[∑
a
Φ(~x(t))∇θjpik(a|~x(t))
]
= (36)
E~x(t)
[∑
a
Φ(~x(t))pik(a|~x(t))
(∇θjW tk(~x(t), a)−∇θj softmax
b
W tk(~x(t), b)
)]
= 0. (37)
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Taking the derivative of the last term of (35) implies
∇θjE~x1 [softmaxW 1j (H1, a)] = E~x1,a[Fj(~x(1), a)] + E~x2,~a2 [∇θjW 2j (H2, aj(2))]+
E~x1,a
[
pi−j(~a−j(1)|~x(t)) softmax
c
W 2j (H
2, c)
∑
k∈−j
∇θj
(
W 1k (H
1, ak(1))− softmax
d
W 1k (H
1, d)
)]
.
Due to (36), the above last term is zero, and by pushing the recursion to the final step, we obtain
∇θjE~x1 [softmaxW 1j (H1, a)] =
∑
t≤T
E~xt,~at [Fj(~x(t), aj(t))].
Similarly, when i 6= j, one can obtain
∇θjE~x1 [softmaxW 1i (H1, a)] = E~x2,~a2 [∇θjW 2i (H2, aj(2))]
= · · · = E~xT ,~aT [∇θjWTi (~x(t), aj(T ))] = 0.
Going back to the derivative of the dual function, we will have two terms: H(~a||~x) and Θ(E[F ]−
E˜[F ]). Due to the above calculation, the derivative of the first term is zero, with respect to θi and the
derivative of the second term concludes the result.
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